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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to bring further understanding to the contested 
relationship between development aid and democracy. By introducing quality of 
democracy as an alternate measure to the ones previously used, the ambition is to 
approach the subject from a new perspective. In this thesis, the following research 
question will be answered: To what extent does Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) affect the quality of democracy in the recipient countries? In order to 
enable a more detailed assessment on the relationship, the effects of aid on the 
three levels of democratic quality will also be investigated. The research question 
is approached through a quantitative method, utilising data consisting of 
observations on 53 democratic regimes that has received aid during the time 
period 1995-2010. The concluding results indicate that, although there is no 
overall effect of development aid on quality of democracy, ODA does have an 
impact on the quality of the different levels.  As the levels of democratic quality 
are affected differently, indicating both negative and positive relationships, both 
sides of previous research gain support. The difference in effect directionality may 
be explained by variations in recipient priorities and trade-offs between the 
democratic dimensions. 
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1 Introduction 
In the public eye, foreign aid is more than often portrayed as an indispensable tool 
for assisting development. This point of view is, however, far from uncontested. 
In connection with the distribution of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic 
Sciences in 2015, the aid debate experienced an upturn. In addition to being 
awarded for his work on welfare, poverty and consumption, the recipient Angus 
Deaton received widespread medial attention due to his stance on foreign aid. 
Deaton (2013) contends that aid will strengthen the positions of inept leaders 
resulting in undesirable outcomes for democracy – an opinion that was deemed to 
be very controversial by the public. Nonetheless, the debate that arose reflects the 
very same tensions that are embedded in the aid-efficiency field. Throughout the 
last couple of decades, aid researchers have been trying to establish whether aid is 
offering recipient countries a helping or a heavy hand. While some scholars 
maintain that aid spurs facilitating factors to democracy, such as economic growth 
and education, others highlight the dangers of corruption and misappropriation 
that would result in the demise of stable political institutions.  
 
Despite the vast supply of extensive research within the field, there is a great lack 
of agreement on aid effects on democratic institutions, as seen above. Why that is, 
however, is still uncertain. The level of disagreement would nevertheless indicate 
that there are still theoretical gaps to be filled. One interesting note is that 
researchers within the field tend to use the same indicators in measuring 
democracy, such as the Freedom House index and Polity score, though the 
measures themselves are seldom problematized. Without further discussion, the 
frequently used measures are in risk of providing a rather unnuanced image of 
democracy. In order to bring further understanding to the relationship between aid 
and democracy, an alternate measure of democracy will be introduced. 
 
In the following chapter, the aim and research question of this thesis will be 
presented. This is followed by a briefing of previously used democracy indicators 
and an introduction to the term quality of democracy. Subsequently, the 
theoretical framework will be presented followed by a section on the 
methodological choices of this thesis. The statistical results will thereafter be 
reported, followed by a discussion and concluding thoughts. 
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2 Purpose and research question 
As researchers are still to reach a unitary conclusion on the effects of aid on 
democracy, it might be favourable to take on a new approach. By drafting an 
alternate measure of democracy the ambition is to enable us to say something 
more substantial about aid-efficiency than has previously been done. In 
introducing the concept quality of democracy, as presented by Diamond and 
Morlino, the expectation is to bring further depth to the knowledge on the subject. 
Not only does the concept have theoretical advantages by offering a more 
extensive grasp of democratic institutions, it is also offers a framework in which 
the functioning of democracy can be problematized further. The measure will 
subsequently be placed in the context of previous research within the aid-
efficiency field in order to investigate to what extent previous conclusions can be 
supported when introducing a new theoretical term. The purpose of this thesis is 
thereby to see if further clarity can be brought to the field by introducing an 
alternate conceptualization of democracy. In order to approach the subject, the 
main research question that will be the basis of this thesis is:  
 
• To what extent does Official Development Assistance (ODA) affect the quality 
of democracy in the recipient countries?  
 
With the intention of enabling a more detailed assessment of aid effects on 
democratic quality, the following sub-question will also be explored:  
 
• How are the different levels of quality of democracy affected by aid flows?1 
 
The questions will be answered by working with the following hypotheses: 1) 
There is a relationship between ODA and quality of democracy, 2) There is be a 
difference in effect directionality between the different levels of quality of 
democracy; both of which will be derived in more detail further on. Prior to 
diving into the subject, however, the central concepts of this thesis need to be 
presented 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Quality of democracy is divided into three different levels (quality of procedure, content and results) that all  
capture different democratic dimensions. These will all be presented further in the following chapter. 
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2.1 Core concepts 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as “[aid] flows to countries 
and territories on the DAC2 List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions 
which are provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or 
by their executive agencies” with the main purpose of increasing welfare and 
economic growth in developing countries (OECD). ODA is a comprehensive type 
of assistance including aid such as technical assistance, dialogues with different 
political actors and debt relief in addition to the traditional aid supply of capital 
(Berlin 2005:7). It does not, however, include military or peacekeeping aid unless 
it is closely connected to actions that promote development (OECD). This type of 
aid is investigated as it is closely connected with the purpose of developing 
democratic institutions in the recipient country3. 
 
Democracy is here defined as a political system that is characterized by having 
free and fair elections with adult suffrage. A democratic system should also allow 
for, and have, more than one eligible political party. In addition, citizens are also 
to have access to different sources of information that are not skewed in 
advantage to the political elite (Diamond & Morlino 2005:x-xi). This definition is 
chosen as it does not put an excessive amount of pressure on the political system 
compared to the democracy definition of, for example, Robert Dahl4.  The broader 
definition allows for lower quality democracies to be included in the study, 
providing a more varied sample. The assessment of the actual quality of 
democracy will be discussed in the following chapter along with the limitations of 
previously used measures. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
2 Development Assistance Committee; a forum consisting of the worlds largest aid funders, working within the 
organizational frames of OECD (OECD). 
3 ODA can be investigated on a more detailed level, for example by looking at differences between bilateral and 
multilateral aid. However, this thesis is delimited to explore the effects of overall ODA, as focus is to be put on 
the possible contributions of introducing a new term to the field. 
4 In addition to the factors mentioned above, Robert Dahl (1989) contends that democratic regimes also need to 
provide its citizens with complete access to the political agenda. The citizens should also have an “enlightened 
understanding” connected to the policy decisions.  
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3 Conceptualization 
3.1 Previously used indicators and limitations 
One of the most frequently used indicators on democracy within aid-efficiency 
research is seemingly the Freedom of the World Index produced by Freedom 
House (see Islam 2003, Dunning 2004, Knack 2004, Heckelman 2010). The 
Freedom House index measures several different indicators such as civil liberties, 
political rights, political pluralism, whether the elected head of government has de 
facto power and other governmental traits (Freedom House). The vantage of this 
indicator lies in the wide scope of the measurement. Not only does it capture the 
freedoms that can be enjoyed by citizens, it also aspires to provide information on 
institutional traits. However, even though the measure seemingly captures a large 
part of the relevant aspects of democracy, Freedom House contends that the 
measure in reality “assesses the real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by 
individuals, rather than governments or government performance per se” (ibid). 
The measure thereby only seems to capture the output that a regime produces, and 
not the actual traits that characterize democratic institutions. 
 
Another commonly used indicator is the combined Polity IV score (see Hoffman 
2003, Bermeo 2009, Wright 2009, Scott & Steele 2011). The polity IV score is 
composed of variables measuring the level of competitiveness, political 
participation, openness of the electoral process and constraints on political leaders 
(Marshall et al 2014:14-7). Although this measure is similar to the Freedom 
House index, it does conversely focus on the actual traits of political institutions, 
rather than on the output they produce. The same critique as above can thereby be 
applied to this measure, as it does only capture a segment of democracy as a 
whole. This might very well be the reason for combining the two, as is also 
commonly seen (see Al-Momani 2003, Finkel et al 2007, Csórdas & Ludwig 
2011, Kangoye 2011). 
 
Although, when combined, the measures above provide a rather comprehensive 
indicator on democracy, it does not signal whether the implemented policies are 
coherent with citizen will or not. According to Robert Dahl, discussing factors as 
such is of utmost importance when talking about democracy, as no regime can be 
deemed to be truly democratic without being responsive to the will of its citizens 
(Dahl 1971). In order to construct a truly representative measure, it is essential to 
include an additional level capturing this aspect of democracy as well. With the 
aim of addressing the above-mentioned limitations, the concept quality of 
democracy will be introduced. 
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3.2 Introducing quality of democracy 
Quality of democracy (QoD) is a comprehensive term aimed to capture the 
essence of a well functioning democracy. The term ranges from institutional 
dimensions to more abstract dimensions concerning citizen opinion on the output 
generated by the political system. By summarizing and compiling results from 
different research articles, Diamond and Morlino suggest that QoD can be defined 
as a system that is composed of eight different dimensions (2005:x). In order to 
make the phenomenon graspable, the dimensions are categorized into three 
different types of quality: procedural, substantive and result oriented, which will 
all be presented below. It is worth to briefly mention that other sources such as 
International IDEA also have provided an assessment of democratic quality. Their 
categorization is however presented as a practical guide in measuring democratic 
quality, rather than as a theoretical framework (see International IDEA 2008:26). 
For this reason, the assessment by Diamond and Morlino is chosen to make out 
the baseline of this study. 
 
 
• Procedural level / Quality of procedure 
 
The procedural level of QoD is focused on the rules and practices within a country 
and consists of five different dimensions: rule of law, participation, competition, 
vertical- and horizontal accountability (Diamond & Morlino 2005:xii). The rule of 
law dimension covers the functioning of legal practices and judicial security in 
society. High quality is attained when citizens are equal before the law and have 
high access to information on the judicial system. The dimension of participation 
translates into citizen access to political influence. Participation by formality 
alone is not sufficient as the government also needs to ensure that all citizens have 
equal possibilities to organize themselves politically, vote in general elections and 
participate in other political activities. A high quality of competition is 
conditioned by accessibility to the political arena where anyone who wishes to 
candidate may do so. Horizontal accountability infers that incumbents and other 
civil servants can hold each other responsible for their actions, decreasing the risk 
of patronage and corruption. Vertical accountability, on the other hand, is 
connected to the relationship between officeholders and the citizens. The citizens 
should have an insight to the work of their ombudsmen and be able to demand 
that incumbents are punished for indefensible actions (Diamond & Morlino 
2005:xiv-xxv). 
 
 
• Substantive level / Quality of content 
 
The substantive level, or quality of content, consists of two dimensions: freedom 
and equality. The freedom dimension aims to capture freedoms within several 
different categories, mainly political, civil and socio-economic. Political freedom 
is attained when the government produces politics that allow citizens to express 
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opinions freely and allow for supporting different political groups without feeling 
threatened by governmental forces. Civil freedoms concern areas such as personal 
security, freedom of expression, religion, assembly and organization. The socio-
economic freedoms are connected to rights regarding employment conditions and 
private property. Equality, on the other hand, entails that all citizens should have 
equal possibilities to influence politics whilst also having a tantamount quality of 
legal protection (Diamond & Morlino 2005:xxv-xxvii). The equality dimension 
can be divided into three different categories of the political sphere: class, 
ethnicity and gender; the three most common grounds on which one might be 
discriminated upon (Rueschemeyer 2005:59).  
 
 
• Results level / Quality of results 
 
The results level of QoD consists of one single dimension: responsiveness. 
Democratic responsiveness emerges when citizen will is reflected coherently in 
the choice of government and implementation of policies (Powell 2005:62). By 
extension, the responsiveness dimension covers how well citizens perceive 
democracy to function, whether their needs and demands are fulfilled, if their 
interests are reflected in the politics and if their expectation on the democratic 
system is met (Diamond & Morlino 2005:xxix). Although this might seem 
unambiguous, it is a process that is truly difficult to fully capture. In order to 
make dimension more graspable, G. Bingham Powell Jr. illustrates this process, or 
chain of responsiveness, as follows: 
 
Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3  Stage 4 
Citizen’s 
preferences 
à Citizen’s voting 
behaviour 
à Selecting policy 
makers 
à Public policies 
and outcomes 
              (Powell 2005:63)  
 
In short, responsiveness is a process that begins in policy preferences held by 
citizens. These preferences are to be reflected in the electoral process if there are 
no disruptions in the chain. When the policy makers have been chosen, they will 
ideally implement the politics they have been elected on basis of. If the political 
outcomes are coherent with citizen’s preferences, the responsiveness dimension is 
defined as being of high quality (Powell 2005). 
3.2.1 The interplay between democratic dimensions 
In order to provide a more intelligible assessment of quality of democracy, the 
concept needs to be placed in a wider context. This segment will act as an epitome 
of theories on the functioning of democratic dimensions, providing a fundamental 
understanding of the interplay between the different levels of QoD. 
 
The most central dimension of quality of democracy is the rule of law. Without a 
functioning judicial system, none of the other dimensions can function properly 
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due to threats of retrenchments (O’Donnell 2005:4). A high level of quality within 
this dimension is disrupted when the laws of a country are enforcing inequalities, 
resulting in judicial insecurity for certain segments of the population (O’Donnell 
2005:10-11). If, however, a high quality rule of law is established, other 
dimensions of quality of democracy are enabled to prosper. For example, as a 
consequence of improved judicial security, citizens will be more inclined to 
participate in the political process. By extension, the accountability dimensions, 
among others, are favoured. Not only are citizens able to suspend incompetent 
politicians, bolstering vertical accountability, but by having political leverage, 
citizens ought to be motivated to secure their own political interests, spurring the 
responsiveness dimension (Schmitter 2005:23-5).  
 
Other than being favoured by an improved quality of participation, responsiveness 
is conditioned by other dimensions such as freedom, equality and accountability 
(O’Donnell 2005:4). When enjoying a certain degree of rights and freedoms, 
citizens are able to elect honest politicians that are truthfully committed to 
implementing requested policies. Competitiveness between elected parties will 
also have positive effects on responsiveness due to an increase in political 
pluralism where the will of several groups in society may be represented5 (Powell 
2005:63). Factors that would hinder the chain of responsiveness, and thereby have 
a negative effect on the quality of results, are for example corruption, political 
choice limitations and restrictions on the flow of information (Powell 2005:69). 
These subversions can be avoided by, inter alia, educating citizens, ensuring 
freedom of media, promoting inclusiveness in policy making, encouraging party 
competition, improving the bureaucratic quality, horizontal and partisan 
accountability; thereby also strengthening the chain of responsiveness (Powell 
2005:68).  
 
As elucidated in the text above, the dimensions are strongly co-varying and their 
effects on democratic quality is at times difficult to single out. Empirically, 
separating the dimensions is not entirely necessary although it does facilitate a 
theoretical discussion on the complex coagency between the different dimensions 
(Beetham 2005:42). The intricacy of this interplay is illuminated by Diamond and 
Morlino who argue that even though the dimensions overlap and often strengthen 
one another, there may also be contradistinctions, or trade-offs, where positive 
effects on one dimension might have negative effects on another. Ultimately, this 
makes it close to impossible to attain an immensely high level of quality on all of 
the levels at once, leaving it up to the regimes to “make an inherently value-laden 
choice about what kind of democracy it wishes to be” (Diamond & Morlino 
2004:20-1). 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
5 Note that there is a slight difference between this type of competition and the competitiveness dimension in the 
procedural level, as this aspect is specifically connected to party competition (see Powell 2005). 
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3.3 Contributions  
By integrating quality of democracy into the context of aid-efficiency, the aim is 
to contribute to previous research on two main grounds. Firstly, by introducing 
QoD, the ambition is to bring a new perspective from which one may discuss 
democratic development. A more comprehensive concept is provided as a new 
aspect, the level of responsiveness, is incorporated into the measure. Secondly, the 
conceptual framework of QoD provides a more detailed account of democracy by 
categorizing the building blocks of democracy on the basis of their divergent 
essence. This opens up for possibilities of bringing a more nuanced view on the 
relationship between development aid and democracy. By enabling observations 
on different levels of democracy and democratic quality, it might even be possible 
to arrive at a conclusion that would explain why previous research have come to 
widely differing conclusions.  
 
In addition to contributing to the theoretical aspects of the field, a study on this 
subject is also likely to be of practical use. By establishing the determinants of 
effective aid supply, one should be able to provide valuable inputs to on-going 
efforts to enhance the positive impacts of foreign aid, which is of utmost 
relevance (Berlin 2005:5). 
 
Following this chapter the theoretical framework, enlaced with previous research, 
will be presented. 
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4 Theoretical framework 
Discrepancies in previous literature obstruct the possibilities to isolate a single 
unitary theoretical foundation that explains aid effects on democratic institutions 
in the recipient countries. A wide array of different causal mechanisms, that 
allegedly explain the different outcomes of aid projects, has been presented. None, 
however, seems to have used QoD as a conceptual framework, making it difficult 
to find theories capturing the whole spectrum of this particular phenomenon. 
Diamond & Morlino argue that, in theory, a high quality of democracy is rooted in 
an effective and sustainable development of law-based rule. In order to provide 
effective aid, they thereby suggest that democratic development needs to befall 
gradually, building up the independence, capacity and authority of law courts. The 
existence of a strong civil society, that has the power of action to de-legitimize 
and remove corrupt leaders from their position, increases the chances for positive 
outcomes from aid (2005:23). However, in order to acquire additional substance 
to the theoretical framework, this short recommendation will not suffice. 
Therefore, a set of theories connected to different dimensions of the term will be 
congregated and presented below in order to map explanations for different 
outcomes. As the literature on the subject has uncovered both negative and 
positive effects of aid, the subject is highly empirical (Kersting & Kilby 
2014:125). Thereby, this chapter will have strong connections to, and to some 
extent also act as a previous research review. 
4.1 Aid-efficiency and democratic development 
In assessing aid effects on democracy, the main assumption is that there is in fact 
a relationship between the two. Institutions are said to be shaped through political 
processes driven by both internal and external factors. Development aid is here 
categorised as an external factor that has the power to reinforce existing 
institutions. This is due to aid in itself being considered to be a political process as 
aid flows are consciously allocated to specific recipients and areas of 
improvement (Askarov & Doucouliagos 2015:56-7). If aid can give rise to new 
institutions is however uncertain. Based on statements made by inter alia 
International IDEA, it is unlikely. They contend that “[d]emocracy cannot be 
imported, or exported, but supported” (International IDEA 2005:12). Below, 
theories supporting both sides of the aid debate will be presented. 
 
Positive outcomes from aid may be expected when it is provided through channels 
such as education and wealth advancement. Following from an increase in the 
level of education and economic capital, citizens are given additional instruments 
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that facilitate political participation. Economic incitements through aid are also 
suggested to make incumbents in the recipient countries more susceptible to 
societal reforms (Askarov & Doucouliagos 2015:603). In addition, an increase in 
susceptibility to change may also be explained by the influence of external 
powers, such as aid agencies, that pressure the political elite to offer its citizens 
greater political rights. Instead of weakening the regime, this may enable the 
government to stay in power due to an increased level of legitimacy (Gibson et al 
2015). Regarding aid-effects on the substantive dimensions of QoD, positive 
outcomes can be expected when aid is consciously aimed at improving the level 
of equality in the recipient country. In the context of, for example gender equality, 
aid is often expended on improving women’s health and increasing school access 
for women (Dreher et al 2015). In summation, most theories concluding that aid 
will have positive effects on democracy stress that aid projects need to have a 
specific purpose of improving certain aspects of society. It is suggested by, inter 
alia, Yener Altunbas and John Thorton that the supposed positive effects of aid on 
democracy could be strengthened if aid was exclusively aimed at improving 
additional institutions in society; such as quality of governance (2014:3927). 
Clearly defined goals for aid projects thereby seem to be key to allocate aid 
successfully.  
 
Aid pessimists, on the other hand, argue that aid is strongly connected to risks of 
misappropriation and aid dependency. Effectively, aid is supposed to have 
negative effects on the power relationship between state and citizen due to the 
state growing less dependent of tax incomes. Not only would this result in a 
greater distance between implemented politics and actual citizen will; it would 
also facilitate patronage and rent seeking (Knack 2001). An increase in 
government revenues by aid is expected to result in a decreased supply of public 
goods, also due to a diminished tax dependency (Svensson 2000). Though foreign 
aid has been appointed negative effects, a group of researchers within the field 
agree that aid itself might not be detrimental. Nevertheless, it is working in 
unfavourable environments (see Askarov & Doucouliagos 2013, Dollar & 
Pritchett 1998). Based on this assumption, it has been argued that aid will only 
induce positive outcomes in environments that have already established good 
policies. Aid should thereby be channelled primarily to relatively stable and 
experienced societies (Burnside & Dollar 2000). For instance, newly established 
democracies might have difficulties to prevent obstacles such as rent-seeking and 
corruption due to plain inexperience. This in combination with frequently 
occurring democratic flaws, such as insufficient checks and balances and flawing 
transparency in the political system, might result in the aid being used for other 
purposes than initially intended (Askarov & Doucouliagos 2013:623-4). In order 
for aid to be truly successful, it should be aimed at directly assisting reformers in 
their political work and not only act as a financial input; thereby avoiding the risk 
of aid dependency. Yet again, it is emphasized that aid should exhort education 
and be based on long-term goals in order to be effective (Dollar & Pritchett 
1998:115-8). 
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4.2 Other determinants of democratic development 
In all probability, aid cannot account for the entire process of democratic 
development. In order to get a complete apprehension of the process, it is 
important to present additional determinants of the phenomenon. Further on in the 
thesis, these will act as controls that will enable us to, with more certainty, draw 
reliable conclusions. Though there are many possible factors that would explain 
democratic development, this segment will revolve around five commonly 
mentioned factors from earlier democracy research: wealth, institutional legacy, 
natural resource dependence, ethnic fractionalization and social unrest. Other 
factors have been utilized, however, they are not consistently reoccurring in the 
research on aid-efficiency, and are thereby excluded from this study in particular. 
 
The main factor that is said to affect democratic development is the economic 
state of a country. From an increase in wealth and income levels follows 
improvements in the welfare system, acting as a spurring factor to democracy 
(Barro 1999:158, Tavares 2003). Whether a developing country has been 
colonized or not would also affect the stability of its democratic institutions 
(Barro 1999:174). Though it is not completely confirmed whether a colonial past 
would result in positive or negative outcomes, it will affect the development of 
democracy as some institutional legacies are bound to remain (Gisselquist 
2014:17). In addition, the level of resource dependence, often reflected in oil 
trade, is an important factor contributing to the level of democracy (Tavares 
2003). A high level of oil dependence is expected to obstruct democratic 
development, as the capital generated by the resources will decrease the 
incitements to generate incomes based on human capital (Barro 1999:158, 164). 
Furthermore, democracy is supposed to be affected by the domestic level of 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization. The theories conclude that a wide variety in 
ethnic groups within a society makes it difficult to agree on a certain set of 
policies. This is due to difficulties satisfying many wills and an increase in 
inequality (Barro 1999:172). Lastly, there is the effect of social unrest within a 
country. The presence of social unrest will act as a fuel for reform as the 
incumbents are forced to comply with the will of the people in order to stabilize 
the political state in society (Acemoglu & Robinson 2000:684). 
 
Now that the main theoretical framework has been provided, the hypotheses of 
this thesis will be presented. 
4.3 Hypotheses 
Though it is not possible to draw a definite conclusion from the selection of 
research products that the previous segment is based on, it might be possible to 
visualize a slight trend in the material (see Appendix 1). Studies on aid-effects on 
dimensions appertained to the procedural level seem to mostly uncover positive 
  12 
relationships, with the exception of studies investigating factors closely connected 
to accountability. Based on this observation, an overall positive effect from aid is 
expected on the quality of procedure. The relationship between aid and the 
substantive level democracy is, however, poorly explored. The main deduction 
seems to indicate that there will be a positive relationship between the two, though 
it is not fully conclusive. A positive or no relationship is thereby expected. Lastly, 
aid effect on the results dimension is far from conclusive yet it indicates a slight 
negative trend (ibid). Therefore, the expected effect on this level ranges from a 
negative, to no relationship. 
 
 Procedure Content Results 
Expected effects from 
aid on democracy + +/0 0/- 
 
The expected effects illustrated above would indicate that the levels of QoD are to 
be affected differently by development aid. Although it is possible that some of 
these levels will show no correlation with aid, an overall relationship between 
development aid and quality of democracy is still expected. This due to previous 
research indicating that there is a de facto relationship. From this eduction, the 
following hypotheses are derived: 
 
• H1: There is a difference in effect directionality between the 
different levels of QoD. 
 
• H2: There is a relationship between ODA and overall quality of 
democracy 
 
Prior to testing the tenability of the hypotheses, the methodological choices of this 
study will be presented. 
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5 Methods and material 
5.1 OLS regression 
In order to approach the research questions, an extensive research design will be 
used. With the intention of investigating if there is a relationship between 
development aid and democratic quality, a set of OLS regressions will be 
performed. Regression analysis allows for the uncovering of relationships 
between several variables whilst also estimating the strength and reliability of the 
results. This is advantageous as it enables the researcher to draw conclusions with 
a specific certainty considering a known set of premises (Teorell & Svensson 
2007:165-6, 199). In this particular study, this method will enable us to estimate 
amount of aid that is needed in order to have a certain effect on democratic 
quality; a possibility that an intensive research design could not provide. 
However, when executing regression analysis there is always a risk of uncovering 
false relationships. Therefore the results need to be controlled thoroughly and 
interpreted with caution. The four main problems with regression analysis that 
need to be accounted for are:  
 
• Faulty model assumptions; if some relevant variables are excluded from the 
main model, there is a risk of drawing faulty, or spurious, conclusions about 
the relationship between the independent and dependent variable. This 
problem is avoided by introducing control variables that could offer an 
alternative explanation to the effects on the dependent variable. If the 
relationship dissipates when introducing these controls, the relationship might 
be spurious (Teorell & Svensson 2007:61, 185). 
 
• Heteroskedasticity; in short meaning that the residuals of the variable are 
unevenly distributed in relation to the estimated regression line. If the 
variables are heavily heteroskedastic, there is a risk of under- or 
overestimating the relationship effect. By introducing robust standard errors, 
this risk can be decreased (White 1980).  
 
• Multicollinearity; occurs when two or more of the independent variables are 
highly correlated. This makes it difficult to properly separate the effects that 
different variables bring to the model. Multicollinearity can be controlled for 
by simply diagnosing the level of collinearity in statistics software. A common 
measure is VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) where it is recommended that VIF 
should not exceed the value of 4, though there are no universal thresholds 
(Sundell 2010 (1)).  
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•  Endogeneity; is a problem that can occur in multiple regressions resulting in 
difficulties interpreting the result correctly. There are several different reasons 
for endogeneity, but the most common one is faulty conclusions on the 
direction of causality (Menaldo 2011). By lagging6 the independent variables 
in the model, problems with endogeneity can be reduced (Duncan et al 
2004:67). 
 
In order to produce as robust results as possible, all of the above suggested 
measures in avoiding drawing faulty conclusions have been taken. A number of 
control variables have been included in the models along with robust standard 
errors. Collinearity tests have been performed and none of the variables exceeded 
the value of 4. Lastly, a time lag of 1 year has been added to account for 
endogeneity.  
 
Furthermore, one of the general assumptions of OLS regression is also that all of 
the observations in the sample are independent of one another. As the same 
countries over a fifteen-year period are observed, this demand is not fully met. 
Commonly, this may be solved by introducing a fixed-effects model, including 
dummy variables for every single country; thereby excluding country-specific 
variance (Torres-Reyna 2007). However, this method has received critique as it 
eliminates all of the variation between the cases with a high risk of eradicating 
important information (Beck and Katz 1996). In order to retain some of the 
necessary information, but still check for case-specific variation, a mild form of 
fixed-effects is here introduced, where dummies for geographical regions will be 
utilised instead. 
5.2 Data 
The material in this study consists of cross-sectional time-series data, covering 53 
countries with democratic rule that has received aid during the time period 1995-
2010. For those years that the included countries are categorized to be autocratic, 
the observations are excluded. The dataset mainly consists of variables provided 
by the Quality of Governance (QoG) institute. However, some additional 
variables have been collected from other databases due to lack of equivalent 
information in the original dataset. The sources for the different variables will be 
presented in the following sub-chapter. 
 
A common problem with research methodology is missing data, and this study is 
not an exception. Initially, the time-span of the study was intended to be more 
extensive but due to missing data on some of the included variables, the time 
period had to be delimited. This is however not posing an immediate threat to the 
study as a time period of ten to fifteen years will be sufficient in order to observe 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
6 Lagging a variable in time-series data infers adding a time delay to the observations.  
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enough variation in the material, enabling the possibility to draw clear conclusions 
from the material (Berlin 2005:11). In order to fill smaller gaps in the material, a 
few variables7 have been linearly interpolated. Linear interpolation is the process 
of imputing additional data by fitting a linear line between the known values 
(Meijering 2002). One variable, Voice and Accountability, has also been 
extrapolated, which is similar interpolation but it also estimates values exceeding 
the known timeframe (Merriam-Webster). However, this imputation was only 
executed for one year in order to minimize the risks of systematic errors in the 
material. These imputations are not expected to affect the results in any great 
extent as they only make out a small fragment of the total data. Of course, a more 
complete set of data is preferred but in order to being able to perform the analysis, 
the available data had to be modified slightly. 
 
As the term quality of democracy consists of a wide array of different dimensions, 
several variables will be used in measuring the phenomenon. In order to make the 
material graspable, the variables will be compiled into four different indexes; one 
for each of the three different levels of democracy and one aiming to capture the 
full spectrum of the phenomenon. Indexation opens up for using several different 
indicators with the intention of measuring one single phenomenon. By doing this, 
one is also able to exclude random variation between the variables, lowering the 
risk for spurious interpretations of the results (Sundell 2012). An additive method 
will be used in constructing the indexes. A suchlike index is created by summing 
the variable values. For example, if the index is to consist of four different 
variables ranging from 1-4, the additive index will take on the values 4-16 
(Sundell 2010 (2)).  
 
Prior to constructing the indexes, small adjustments had to be made to the data. 
Firstly, some variables had to be reverse coded in order for them to vary in the 
same direction: from low quality to high. This is important as low values on the 
separate variables all need to indicate a low quality of democracy. In addition, the 
variables also needed to be standardized8 in order to have the same weights9 in the 
index. This needs to be done if the variables are to have the same effect on the 
index variation (ibid). An exception has however been made for two variables, 
Voice & Accountability and Government Efficiency, as they are capturing several 
theoretical indicators of QoD. This will all become clearer in the 
operationalization that follows. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7 The interpolated variables are: Average education; male and female (+25) and GINI-index. 
8 Standarization is the process of recoding a variable to range between the values of 0 to 1, independent of how 
many categories the variable initially consisted of. 
9 Statistical weight here denotes the proportion of the total index variation that is made out by a single variable. 
If a variable has the weight value +2, this infers that the variable weighs twice as much as a variable that has the 
weight value +1. 
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5.3 Operationalization 
The main independent variable in the model, Official Development Assistance, is 
collected from the World DataBank and measures the level of received net ODA 
(World Bank). This variable has been divided by the level of GDP in order to 
make it comparable between countries. All of the control variables are collected 
from the QoG-database and are the following: 1) GDP per Capita, acting as an 
indicator on the economic prosperity of a country, 2) Colonial Origin10, stating 
whether the recipient country has ever been colonized, 3) Ethnic 
Fractionalization, measuring the level of ethnic heterogeneity in society, 4) Oil 
Net Export, acting as an indicator on level of resource dependence, 5) Political 
Stability, used as an indicator on social unrest as it measures the propensity of 
governmental change through violent means (Dahlberg et al 2015). These are all 
derived from previous democracy research, as can be seen on page 11. 
 
Below, all of the different levels of QoD will be appointed a set of variables. The 
variables will be presented in tables in order to make the presentation more 
synoptic. Due to space restrictions, focus will be aimed at discussing the 
operationalization of the most elusive variables.  
 
 
• QUALITY OF PROCEDURE 
 
Variable Theoretical 
dimension(s) 
Measuring… Weight 
Rule of Law a Rule of law The level of predictability in the 
judicial system that is effectively 
upheld by the state, resulting in a 
stable and secure society. 
+1 
Participation a Participation The percentage of voter 
turnout in non-rigged 
elections. 
+1 
Competition a Competition The electoral success of 
smaller parties in general 
elections. 
+1 
Checks and 
Balances a 
Vertical 
accountability 
The transparency and 
separation between executive 
and judicial power 
+1 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
10 The variable Colonial Origin has been recoded into a dummy-variable where 0 = never colonized by a western 
power and 1 = colonized by a western power. Initially, the variable contained information on which colonial 
powers that had annexed the area - information that is irrelevant for the purpose of this thesis. 
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ICRG indicator of 
Quality of 
Governance a 
Horizontal 
accountability 
Corruption, bureaucratic 
quality, enforcement of law 
and order and the absence of 
political pressure on 
bureaucratic institutions. 
+1 
Sources: a = QoG-institute, b = WorldBank, c = Gapminder 
 
Most of the variables above seem to be strongly connected to their respective 
theoretical dimension. The difficulties lie in operationalizing the accountability 
dimensions. According to Schmitter, a well functioning judicial system is most 
likely to contain a high level of checks and balances. This is a spurring factor to 
the vertical accountability as different branches of power will be able to hold one 
another accountable for certain actions and, by extension, avoid misuse of power 
(2005:24). Thereby, Checks and Balances seem to be a well-suited variable in 
measuring vertical accountability.  
 
Utilising Quality of Governance as an indicator on horizontal accountability might 
not be as straightforward due the connection being more indirect. When 
bureaucratic institutions are not free from political pressure, and the quality of 
governance is low, there is a risk of closing strong ties between politicians and 
businessmen (Dahlberg et al 2015:69). In connection with the previously 
presented theories, closer ties between the government and businessmen might 
decrease tax dependence, simultaneously decreasing the political leverage held by 
citizens (see pp. 10). As a result from this, the horizontal accountability is 
expected to be affected negatively. 
 
 
• QUALITY OF CONTENT 
 
Variable Theoretical 
dimension(s) 
Measuring… Weight 
Civil Liberties a Freedom  
(civil) 
The degree of personal freedom 
from interference by the state, e.g. 
freedom of expression, belief and 
organizational rights. 
+1 
Political Rights a Freedom 
(political) 
Citizen access the political 
process in society, e.g. the 
right to vote, candidate in 
elections and join political 
parties.  
+1 
Economic Freedom 
of the World a 
Freedom 
(economic) 
Citizen e.g.  property rights, 
freedom of trade and access 
to money. 
+1 
GINI-index c Equality 
(class) 
Income distribution, from 
perfect equality to perfect 
inequality. 
+1 
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Ratio Between 
Female and Male 
Labour b 
Equality 
(gender) 
How many women per man 
that are enrolled in paid 
labour. 
+1 
Sources: a = QoG-institute, b = World Bank, c = Gapminder 
 
When operationalizing the substantive level of QoD, the main difficulties lay in 
measuring the full spectrum of the equality dimension. Using the ratio between 
male and female labour as an indicator for gender equality is far from ideal but 
due to a massive loss in data for variables such as GII (Gender Inequality Index), 
this was the most defensible choice in the trade-off between maintaining validity 
and coping with missing data. Difficulties in finding data have also resulted in the 
absence of a variable measuring inequality between ethnic groups. However, as 
several variables are used to measure the quality of content, some of the effects 
posed by the absent variables are expected to be captured by the other indicators 
in the index (see Sundell 2012). 
 
• QUALITY OF RESULTS 
 
Measuring quality of results has been proven to be the most difficult. Powell 
suggests two different methods in approaching this level of democratic quality. 
One is to cover citizen attitudes and perceptions of how contented they are with 
the functioning of the democratic system they live in. The other is to attempt to 
measure the components of the actual chain of responsiveness. In practice, this 
may be done by compiling different factors that would strengthen the chain11 
(Powell 2005:72-3). The latter has here been chosen for two reasons. Firstly, 
citizen attitudes by themselves are a very unstable measure. Very few, even well 
educated, will have a clear apprehension of the implications of responsiveness 
(Diamond & Morlino 2005:xxix-xxxi). Secondly, by looking at indicators of a 
well functioning chain of responsiveness, all of the data in this study is kept on a 
macro level, enabling a final merge of all the variables creating the overall QoD 
index. The operationalization of the dimensions is as follows: 
 
Variable Strengthening 
factors 
Measuring… Weight 
Average Schooling 
Years, Female and 
Male (+25) a 
Education Average years of education 
undertaken by men and women 
over the age of 25. 
+1 
Legislative Electoral 
Competition a 
Party 
competition 
The level of competition 
between government parties. 
Ranges from unelected 
government (no competition) 
to a parliament where the 
largest party has got less than 
75% of the seats. 
+1 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
11 These factors were mentioned briefly on page 7. 
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Voice and 
Accountability a 
Media access, 
Inclusive 
policymaking, 
Horizontal 
accountability 
The level of inclusiveness in 
the process of government 
elections and the 
independence of media, 
which serves a facilitating 
role in monitoring of 
authority. 
+3 
Government 
Effectiveness a 
Bureaucratic 
capacity, 
Partisan 
accountability 
The quality of public service 
provision, bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, 
the independence of the civil 
service from political 
pressures and the credibility 
of government commitment 
to policies. 
+2 
Sources: a = QoG-institute, b = World Bank, c = Gapminder 
 
The measure on quality of results differs slightly from the other measures as it, 
rather than measuring the dimension responsiveness directly, measures factors 
that act in strengthening the chain of responsiveness. It is also the only index 
where variables have been given additional weight, as they capture more than one 
spurring factor. These variables are Voice and Accountability and Government 
Effectiveness, as can be deduced from the table above. It is here worth to mention 
that the Voice and Accountability variable was not used in measuring horizontal 
accountability on the procedural level as it captures indicators exceeding the 
theoretical grasp of the dimensions included in that level. 
 
Though Government Effectiveness captures several indicators, they can only be 
assigned to two theoretical strengthening factors. Here, the quality of public 
service provision, quality of bureaucracy and competence of civil servants are 
considered to be decent indicators on the bureaucratic capacity of a government. 
Furthermore, the independence of civil service from political pressures and the 
credibility of government commitment to policies are supposed to indicate the 
level of partisan accountability in society 
 
Lastly, all of the variables making up the separate level indexes were added into 
one single index aiming to capture the whole phenomenon. 
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6 Results 
To begin with, the relationship between ODA and the different levels of 
democratic quality will be explored, ultimately, building up to the effect on 
overall QoD. Three different model specifications will be used in order to ensure 
robust results and to see how the data behaves under different circumstances. The 
results produced in the third, and last, model will be considered to be most reliable 
as it contains the most demanding robustness checks12. In order to make the 
presentation of the results more lucid, the regional dummies have been left out 
from the tables presented below. They are however reported in Appendix 2. The 
results are only to be followed by a brief explanation, as they will be discussed 
more thoroughly in the following chapter. 
6.1 Quality of procedure 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
12 It is in the third model that regional fixed-effects and time-lag is introduced as final robustness checks. 
Table 1. Regression analysis. Dependent variable: Quality of procedure. Robust standard errors  
               are specified within the parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Aid/GDP (%) -0,433*** 
(0,082) 
-0,166** 
(0,065) 
0,116* 
(0,067) 
GDP/capita  0,014*** 
(0,001) 
0,015*** 
(0,001) 
Colonial past  -0,022** 
(0,009) 
0,171*** 
(0,033) 
Ethnic  
fractionalization 
 -0,068*** 
(0,019) 
0,108*** 
(0,026) 
Oil export  -0,082*** 
(0,028) 
-0,057** 
(0,027) 
Social unrest  0,031*** 
(0,007) 
0,082*** 
(0,007) 
R2 0,081 0,484 0,641 
N 826 573 475 
***=p<0,01, **=p<0,05, *=p<0,1 
N = number of observations, R2= the percentage of variation in y that can be explained by x. 
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From the univariate model (1) in the table above, one can deduce a significantly 
negative relationship between development aid and quality of procedure. This 
implies that the more aid a country receives, the less procedural quality it can 
enjoy. When adding the control variables to the model, significance is maintained 
though indicating a slightly weaker effect. When additionally lagging the model 
and controlling for regional effects, significance is maintained though the 
directionality of the relationship is reversed. With the robust model specifications, 
the test indicates that for every 1% of ODA in proportion GDP, quality of 
procedure will increase by 0,12%.  Though the effect is small, the results go in 
line with our initial expectations. 
6.2 Quality of content 
 
Regarding the relationship between ODA and substantive quality, the first model 
shows a significantly negative relationship between the two. This would imply 
that an increase in aid would result in a decrease in substantive quality. However, 
the relationship dissipates when introducing control variables into the model. 
Notwithstanding, the results regain significance when additional robustness 
checks are executed, still indicating a negative relationship between the two main 
variables. The results show that a 1% increase in aid in proportion to GDP would 
result in a 0,37% decrease in quality of content. The explanations for the re-
Table 2. Regression analysis. Dependent variable: Quality of content. Robust standard errors  
              are specified within the parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Aid/GDP (%) -0,310** 
(0,139) 
-0,137 
(0,124) 
-0,367** 
(0,175) 
GDP/capita  0,009*** 
(0,002) 
0,016*** 
(0,003) 
Colonial past  -0,014 
(0,014) 
0,144*** 
(0,040) 
Ethnic  
fractionalization 
 0,156*** 
(0,033) 
0,162*** 
(0,036) 
Oil export  -0,154*** 
(0,023) 
-0,202*** 
(0,029) 
Social unrest  0,154*** 
(0,010) 
0,137*** 
(0,011) 
R2 0,009 0,605 0,745 
N 502 376 323 
***=p<0,01, **=p<0,05, *=p<0,1 
N = number of observations, R2= the percentage of variation in y that can be explained by x. 
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emergence of the relationship can be many. One could be that the relationship is 
highly dependent on regional factors, as the success rate of aid might differ 
greatly between different geographical regions. This is highlighted by Diamond 
and Morlino as they content that “there is no sequence of reforms to improve the 
quality of democracy that would be right for all countries due to too much 
variation among the cases” (2005:xxxix).  Altogether, the produced results are in 
conflict with the expected effects. 
6.3 Quality of results 
 
Initially, the test on the univariate model demonstrates a significant negative 
relationship between aid and quality of results. This relationship is maintained 
throughout the more demanding model specifications, indicating highly robust 
results. The last and most demanding model shows that a 1% increase in aid in 
proportion to GDP would result in a 0,27% decrease in quality of results. As in 
the tests above, the impact of aid seems to be small. However, the results are very 
significant, and support the initial expectations. 
 
 
Table 3. Regression analysis. Dependent variable: Quality of results. Robust standard errors  
              are specified within the parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Aid/GDP (%) -0,685*** 
(0,127) 
-0,360*** 
(0,037) 
-0,272*** 
(0,050) 
GDP/capita  0,012*** 
(0,001) 
0,012*** 
(0,001) 
Colonial past  0,017** 
(0,007) 
0,116*** 
(0,020) 
Ethnic  
fractionalization 
 -0,032** 
(0,015) 
-0,001 
(0,020) 
Oil export  -0,123*** 
(0,017) 
-0,115*** 
(0,019) 
Social unrest  0,057*** 
(0,004) 
0,071*** 
(0,005) 
R2 0,191 0,769 0,791 
N 639 439 407 
***=p<0,01, **=p<0,05, *=p<0,1 
N = number of observations, R2= the percentage of variation in y that can be explained by x. 
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6.4 Overall quality of democracy 
 
The initial relationship between development aid and overall quality of democracy 
is significantly negative, indicating that an increase in aid in proportion to GDP 
would result in a decrease in QoD. The significance is, however, not maintained 
when exposing the relationship to additional pressure. Based on these results, it is 
assumed that there is no relationship between overall quality of democracy and 
development aid. Though the results defy the initial expectations, they are indeed 
very interesting, as the different levels of QoD were all significant on their own. 
In an attempt to bring the results further depth, and to provide explanations for the 
observed outcomes, the results will be discussed further in the chapter that 
follows. 
Table 4. Regression analysis. Dependent variable: Quality of democracy. Robust standard errors  
              are specified within the parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Aid/GDP (%) -0,663*** 
(0,134) 
-0,138 
(0,089) 
-0,215 
(0,139) 
GDP/capita  0,020*** 
(0,002) 
0,023*** 
(0,002) 
Colonial past  0,024** 
(0,010) 
0,254*** 
(0,029) 
Ethnic  
fractionalization 
 0,061** 
(0,030) 
0,117*** 
(0,032) 
Oil export  -0,203*** 
(0,025) 
-0,178*** 
(0,036) 
Social unrest  0,104*** 
(0,009) 
0,122*** 
(0,010) 
R2 0,059 0,744 0,820 
N 309 256 239 
***=p<0,01, **=p<0,05, *=p<0,1 
N = number of observations, R2= the percentage of variation in y that can be explained by x. 
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7 Discussion 
Lastly, the results presented above need to be connected to the initial hypotheses. 
In order to answer the question whether Official Development Assistance has any 
effect on QoD and its different levels, the following hypotheses were tested: 
 
H1: There is a difference in effect directionality between the different levels of      
 QoD. 
H2: There is an overall relationship between ODA and quality of democracy. 
 
Below, the results of this study will be connected to the theoretical framework, 
along with an attempt to seek an explanation for the results that has been 
produced. 
7.1 Hypothesis 1: There is a difference in aid effect 
on the different levels of QoD 
The table below visualizes the initial expectations of this thesis, followed by the 
actual results produced. Overall, the expectations seem to have been met. The 
result regarding the relationship between ODA and quality of content was the only 
one to deviate. This was however not entirely unexpected as research on the 
relationship between aid and the level of freedom and equality is relatively 
inconclusive, thereby causing the expectations to be based on a small set of 
studies. 
 
 Procedure Content Results 
Expected effects from 
aid on democracy + +/0 0/- 
Test results + - - 
 
Bringing support to aid-optimists within the field, the results indicate that there is 
a positive relationship between development aid and quality of procedure. The 
results are not uncanny, and the relationship has been attributed several 
explanations. A common denominator, however, seems to be that when the 
conditions under which aid is provided limits recipient power, thereby avoiding 
misappropriation of the funding, positive outcomes may be expected (Tavares 
2003). This is not, however, solely applicable to the procedural dimension of 
QoD, and should produce positive effects throughout all of the dimensions if 
implemented accordingly. Although this would explain why aid might produce 
positive outcomes, it does not explain why the different QoD-levels are affected 
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differently. However, Kersting and Kilby have presented an explanatory model 
for the differing effects from aid on different democratic institutions. They 
contend that positive effects from aid are easier to obtain on palpable institutions 
and processes than, for example, improving governance, as this level is seemingly 
more accessible to aid donators. It is for instance possible, during the preparatory 
work for an election, to support dimensions such as competition and 
accountability by funding opposition parties, supporting independent media and 
introducing poll observers (2014:126). This way, aid can be aimed directly at a 
specific area of improvement, which is the main requirement in providing 
successful aid (see pp. 10-11). As the other levels of quality of democracy might 
be harder to access, positive outcomes might be more difficult to achieve.  
 
Kersting and Kilby’s assessment gains additional strength when applied to the 
results regarding the substantive level of QoD. As a large part of development aid 
is being directly aimed at improving equality and freedoms in society, the 
relationship should, by all logic, be positive (see pp. 10). Nevertheless, our results 
indicate that the relationship is reversed. This could very well be because the 
substantive level might be harder to access as aiding, for example, equality might 
be a more intricate mission than strengthening the electoral process. Another 
possible explanation is that perhaps the effects are working in more complex ways 
than previously declared. It is possible that aid aimed at improving the substantive 
level will have seemingly positive outcomes, but simultaneously activating a 
chain effect affecting other democratic dimensions, ultimately resulting in a 
negative net effect. Such trade-offs, as Diamond and Morlino describe them, have 
been mentioned previously in this paper, and will be discussed in more detail in 
the following sub-chapter. Due to the lack of previous research on this particular 
subject, it is difficult to provide steadfast conclusions about the mechanisms 
producing the observed results. We are thereby left at mere speculations regarding 
the applicability of the theories on the subject. In conclusion, the relationship 
between development aid and the substantive level of QoD is in need of further 
exploration. 
 
Lastly, the regression analysis shows a negative relationship between ODA and 
the results dimension, supporting the aid-pessimists in the matter. Turning to the 
theoretical framework, an appropriate explanation for the relationship between aid 
and the results level may possibly be found in the research of Stephen Knack. Aid 
is here said to skew the power balance between the state and the citizens by 
providing alternate state revenue to tax. This effectively makes the state less 
dependent of tax incomes resulting in an increased rift between the government 
and its population (2001:312-3). Parallels may here be drawn to the 
responsiveness dimension. When tax dependence decreases, the citizens lose their 
main leverage by which they can influence the politics. Ultimately, this might 
result in a rift between citizen’s policy preferences, and the de facto implemented 
politics. As a result, the results level of QoD is to be affected negatively. 
 
The results of this study support the first hypotheses, concluding that the different 
levels of democratic quality are in fact affected differently by aid flows. This is 
very interesting indeed, as it brings support to both sides of the aid debate. By 
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extension, this would imply that research within the field needs to be 
problematized further in order to being able to reach a unitary conclusion about 
the true effects and mechanisms behind the relationship between aid and 
democracy.  
7.2 Hypothesis 2: There is an overall relationship 
between ODA and quality of democracy 
The last test indicates that there is no significant relationship between Official 
Development Assistance and overall quality of democracy, which is surprising. 
Evidently, development aid does have an effect on the different components of 
QoD, but somehow the effect dissipates when they are compiled. The explanation 
might be found in the differing directionalities of the relationships between ODA 
and the separate levels of democratic quality. As positive effects from aid are seen 
on the procedural dimensions, the reversed effect is observed on the remaining 
dimensions. When compiled, it is thereby possible that the differing effects cancel 
each other out, similar to a zero-sum game, where no net effect is left to be seen. 
This is however not completely unexpected as these interplays, or trade-offs, are 
discussed by Diamond and Morlino. Though the interplay between the dimensions 
of QoD has merely been featured briefly, it might very well be the explanation for 
the results. The phenomenon will thereby be approached in more depth in this 
segment. 
 
Although trade-offs are considered to be central to the term quality of democracy, 
even Diamond and Morlino lack in their assessment of the phenomenon. While 
theories on trade-offs are scarce, some examples are provided. One example that 
is highlighted is the trade-off between the level of content and results. By listening 
to the preferences of the majority, a government may very well be responsive to 
the general will and implement the requested policies without any particular 
remarks. However, when actively choosing to satisfy the will of one group, the 
government is in risk of neglecting the needs of other groups in society. 
Effectively, this would have negative consequences on the substantive level of 
QoD, as inequalities indicate a low quality of content (Diamond & Morlino 
2004:20-1, 30). Similar trade-offs has been seen between the procedural and 
substantive level of QoD during the democratization of India. By allowing an 
additional set of minority groups to access the electoral process, the government 
of India momentarily experienced impairments in the rule of law, making them 
unable to protect political rights and personal security (Diamond & Morlino 
2005:xxxix-xl). As a result, Diamond and Morlino contend that a high quality of 
democracy cannot be achieved by maximising the quality on all of the levels. 
Quality of democracy is rather about choosing which democratic levels that are to 
be prioritised (Diamond & Morlino 2004:21). By extension, these priorities will 
most likely reflect on the implementation of aid as both donors and recipients will 
have an apprehension of where aid allocations are the most needed. This is 
elucidated by Askarov and Doucouliagos who state the following: 
  27 
 
“Aid recipients might place different priorities on the various 
dimensions of institutions. Their priorities will depend upon their 
history, their level of development, their aspirations and the elites’ 
willingness to preserve the status quo. For example, countries might 
prefer to place greater emphasis on developing electoral participation, a 
free press and an independent judiciary and relatively less emphasis on 
improving governance and fighting corruption” (Askarov & 
Doucouliagos 2015:58). 
 
Here it is emphasized that, in addition to varying levels of accessibility, the aim of 
priorities are central in determining the outcomes of aid. When one prioritizes the 
improvement of a certain institution, the action might be successful. 
Simultaneously, however, the allocation might have unforeseen trade-offs that 
will affect the outcomes on other aspects of democracy, as could be the case for 
the effects on the substantive level. This could very well explain why the overall 
effect on QoD is cancelled out altogether. 
 
Based on the discussion above, there are problems with compiling all of the 
dimensions of democratic quality into one single measure, as a high level of detail 
in the information is lost. According to Schmitter, this is a commonly committed 
error in empirical research on democratization as there is an “urge to collapse a 
sizeable range of data into a single number or name” (2005:26). This critique 
could be aimed at previously used measures as well. For example, the Freedom 
House index compiles indicators on substantial dimensions, such as civil and 
political rights, with procedural dimensions, such as participation and 
competitiveness (Freedom House). Of course, the adequacy of the measure should 
not be rejected as its popularity, with most certainty, can be derived from a set of 
well-balanced methodological choices. The problem is, however, that the measure 
does not allow for observing effects on the different democratic dimensions, 
diminishing the complexity of the relationship. Thereby, by using similar 
measures, one is at risk of providing a too simplified account of aid effects on 
democratic development. Though QoD suffers from imperfections as well, it does 
capture additional aspects of democracy whilst contributing with an important 
framework in which it is possible to discuss the interplay between different 
democratic dimensions. 
 
If we are to reach a more conclusive answer on aid effectiveness in relation to 
democracy, it is in most likelihood not done by repeating frailties in previous 
research. Based on the results above, the interplay between different democratic 
dimensions, and how aid affects these connections, is in need of further 
investigation. The recommendation for future research is to use a similar 
conceptual framework to the one that that has been used here in exploring other 
angles of the field. As ODA is a very extensive form of aid, it is suggested to use 
more detailed indicators in investigating whether different types of aid might have 
different effects on democratic quality. Exploring differences between 
geographical regions is also recommended, as aid-effectiveness seems to be 
highly dependant of regional variance (see pp. 22 and Appendix 2). 
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8 Conclusions 
The focus of this study has been to examine the impact of development aid on 
democratic quality. By availing a quantitative method, the relationship Official 
Development Aid and quality of democracy has been investigated in order to 
answer the main research question: To what extent does Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) affect the quality of democracy in the recipient countries? In 
order to provide more detailed results, the following sub-question was also 
introduced: How are the different levels of quality of democracy affected by aid 
flows? From previous research, two hypotheses were derived, stipulating the 
expectations that 1) there is an overall effect of aid on quality of democracy 
(QoD), and 2) the effect of aid will differ between the different levels QoD. 
 
Based on the results of this study, there is no robust relationship to be found 
between ODA and quality of democracy. This would imply that aid does not 
affect the quality of democracy in the recipient countries in any known manner. 
Nevertheless, when attempting to answer the sub-question, the true answer seems 
to be much more complex. The results show that all of the different levels of QoD 
are significantly affected by aid flows, though the effect directionality differs. 
While quality of procedure seems to be affected positively by development aid, 
the other levels indicate a negative relationship. This might infer that there in fact 
a relationship between ODA and the quality of democracy. However, the interplay 
between the different democratic dimensions might cause the net effect to 
dissipate. In addition, factors such as recipient priorities and institutional access 
are expected to affect the outcomes of aid. 
 
Although QoD as a crude measure is not necessarily proven to be vastly better 
than previously used measures, it has contributed with a critical viewpoint on 
previous research. The conceptual framework of the term has enabled a discussion 
of aid effects on counterweights in democracy, highlighting the complexity of the 
subject. This implies that in order to reach a conclusive answer regarding the true 
relationship between foreign aid and democracy, a change in perspectives might 
be needed. 
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Appendix 1 
Author(s)	 Procedure	 Content	 Result	 Effect	 Mechanisms	
Askarov	(1)	
Participation,	
rule	of	law,	
accountability,	
transparency	
		 		 +	
Technical	assistance,	strengthening	
legislatures	and	judiciaries	that	check	the	
executive	power.	Aid	makes	it	easier	for	
elites	to	accept	reform.	Aid	works	
indirectly	through	income	and	education	
Tiwari	 		 Economic	freedom	 		 +	 N/A	
Dreher,	Gehring,	
Klasen	 		
Gender	
equality	 		 +	
Especially	strong	when	aimed	at	improving	
equality,	important	goal	for	ODA.	Focus	on	
opportunities	to	study,	improving	
reproductive	health	and	family	planning.	
Gibson,	
Hoffman,	
Jablonski	
Patronage	(?)	 		
Political	
concession,	
patronage	
+	
Technical	assistance	-->To	stay	in	power,	
autocrats	granted	opponents	political	
rights,	increasing	competition.		
Tavares	 Corruption	 		 Corruption	 +	
Aid	associated	with	conditions	that	limit	
recipient	power,	increased	salaries	for	
public	employees	-->	lower	risks	of	
corruption	
Altunbas,	
Thorton	
Competitiveness,	
transparency,	
participation	
		 		 (+)	 N/A,	Effect	would	increase	if	aid	was	aimed	to	improve	QoG.	
Charron	 Corruption,	QoG	 		 Corruption	 0	 N/A,	no	effect	
Knack	(2004)	1	 		
Political	
freedom	/	
Civil	
liberties	
		 0	
N/A,	some	aid	projects	may	have	some	
effect	that	is	taken	away	by	ineffective	aid	
provision	
Knack	(2004)	2	 Accountability	 		 Selection	of	executives	 0	
N/A,	some	aid	projects	may	have	some	
effect	that	is	taken	away	by	ineffective	aid	
provision	
Askarov	(2)	 QoG	 		 		 0/-	
Young	democracies:	Lag	in	abolishment	of	
corruption,	insufficient	checks	and	
balances,	lack	of	transparency,	lack	of	anti-
rent-seeking	measures	
Svensson	 		 		
Seizure	of	power,	
manipulations	of	
bureaucrats,	
redistribution	
skew	
(-)	
Increase	in	government	revenues	may	
lower	provision	of	public	goods,	increase	
rent	dissipation,		
Knack	(2001)	 QoG	 		 		 -	
Retarding	the	development	of	a	healthy	
civil	society,	reducing	tax	dependence,	
facilitating	patronage	and	rent-seeking	
Djankov,	
Montalvo,	
Reynal-Querol	
		 		 Party	competetiveness	 -	 N/A	
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Appendix 2 
 Procedure Content Results QoD 
Aid/GDP (%) 0,116* 
(0,067) 
-0,367** 
(0,175) 
-0,272*** 
(0,050) 
-0,215 
(0,139) 
GDP/capita 0,015*** 
(0,001) 
0,016*** 
(0,003) 
0,012*** 
(0,001) 
0,023*** 
(0,002) 
Colonial past 0,171*** 
(0,033) 
0,144*** 
(0,040) 
0,116*** 
(0,020) 
0,254*** 
(0,029) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0,108*** 
(0,026) 
0,162*** 
(0,036) 
-0,001 
(0,020) 
0,117*** 
(0,032) 
Oil netexport -0,057** 
(0,027) 
-0,202*** 
(0,029) 
-0,115*** 
(0,019) 
-0,178*** 
(0,036) 
Social unrest 0,082*** 
(0,007) 
0,137*** 
(0,011) 
0,071*** 
(0,005) 
0,122*** 
(0,010) 
Eastern Europe 
 
0,253*** 
(0,037) 
0,103* 
(0,057) 
-0,047** 
(0,022) 
0,256*** 
(0,051) 
Latin America 0,081*** 
(0,012) 
-0,096*** 
(0,036) 
-0,145*** 
(0,030) 
0,004 
(0,039) 
North Africa & the  
Middle East 
0,400*** 
(0,042) 
-0,111* 
(0,066) 
- 0,211*** 
(0,054) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0,032* 
(0,018) 
- -0,174*** 
(0,033) 
- 
Western Europe and 
North America 
- - - - 
East Asia 0,237*** 
(0,039) 
0,283*** 
(0,058) 
-0,057** 
(0,026) 
0,326*** 
(0,053) 
South-East Asia 0,194*** 
(0,025) 
0,046 
(0,040) 
-0,076*** 
(0,024) 
0,155*** 
(0,045) 
South Asia 0,261*** 
(0,029) 
-0,030 
(0,049) 
-0,107*** 
(0,029) 
0,149*** 
(0,045) 
The Pacific - - - - 
The Caribbean - 0,031 
(0,037) 
-0,124*** 
(0,035) 
0,075* 
(0,041) 
R2 0,641 0,745 0,791 0,820 
N 475 323 407 239 
***=p<0,01, **=p<0,05, *=p<0,1 
N = number of observations, R2= the percentage of variation in y that can be explained by x. 
 
